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Abstract:  
Do potential entrepreneurs exploit welfare-destroying opportunities as much as 
they exploit welfare-enhancing opportunities as it is assumed in several 
normative models? Do we need to prevent potential entrepreneurs from being 
destructive or are there intrinsic limits to harm others? We experimentally 
investigate how people with different entrepreneurial intent exploit risky 
investment opportunities that are associated with negative and positive 
externalities. We find that participants who consider entrepreneurship as a future 
occupation invest significantly less than others in destructive opportunities. 
Nevertheless, our results support prior evidence that the entrepreneurially 
talented invest more in destructive opportunities. The latter effect seems to be 
entrepreneurship-specific, because the investment behavior of the generally more 
talented does not differ from that of other participants. Taken together, our 
results suggest that people who are willing to exploit destructive opportunities do 
not only do this in private ventures, but also – and maybe even more so – in 
wage employment.  
Highlights:  
 We examine correlations between entrepreneurial attitudes, investment 
with externalities and other-regarding behavior.  
 We consider investments causing positive, negative, and no externalities.  
 Entrepreneurial self-efficacy correlates with more investment in general.  
 Entrepreneurial intent correlates with less investment for negative 
externalities.  
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is often considered as a productive force, as is evident in 
Schumpeter (1911), who puts the entrepreneur center stage in his theory of 
innovation and capitalist development. Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991) 
argued, however, that entrepreneurial talent maximizes private returns that do not 
need to be aligned with social returns and, therefore, may allocate into unproductive 
activities, such as rent-seeking. The latter is commonly understood as “any 
redistributive activity that takes up resources” (Murphy et al., 1993: 409). Based on 
such allocation models, these researchers call for institutions that better guide, or 
limit, entrepreneurial activities. The assumption of self-interested entrepreneurs is 
present in other entrepreneurship models, too. For instance, based on the assumption 
of private return maximization, models of financial contracting between 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists predict efficiency losses due to resulting moral 
hazard dilemmas (Casmatta 2003; Eltizur & Gavious, 2003; Fairchild, in press). These 
inefficiencies would be reduced by the existence of entrepreneurs with less selfish 
attitudes (Fairchild, 2010). Entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward selfishness and 
benevolence are, therefore, of wide interest, inside and outside more narrow fields 
such as social responsibility and social entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Dees, 2007; Tracey 
& Jarvis, 2007). 
The theoretical assumption of private return maximization, which is causal for 
the previously mentioned inefficiencies and welfare losses, was challenged by 
empirical and experimental economists, who find across many contexts that people 
care about others (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni & 
Miller, 2002). While there is an ongoing discussion on the reasons for these findings 
(see Binmore & Shaked, 2010; Fehr & Schmidt, 2010; Wilson, 2010), the observed 
pattern is unambiguous: whether the reasons are fairness, inequity aversion, or 
altruism, on average, people do not seem to exclusively allocate their resources into 
activities with the highest private returns if they harm other people’s returns. 
Given this contrast between entrepreneurship models and experimental 
evidence, Weitzel et al. (2010) investigated the association of entrepreneurship with 
selfish behavior in dictator games. They study whether the general finding of caring 
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about others equally holds for entrepreneurially talented people. While empirical 
entrepreneurship literature provides many insights into various personality traits, 
which includes openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and 
neuroticism (representing the “Big Five”: John & Srivastava, 1999; applied to 
entrepreneurship by, e.g., Zhao et al., 2010; Gruber, in press), there is a research gap 
with respect to fairness, honesty, and benevolence. Benevolence is a personality trait 
that in recent personality research emerged as a sixth important trait, next to the “Big 
Five” (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Hilbig & Zettler, 2009). Weitzel et al.’s (2010) findings 
show that believing to be better than others in doing business is negatively associated 
with benevolence. This especially holds true for people who report that they are less 
creative. Weitzel et al.’s (2010) results reinforce the stereotype of the socially 
interested creative person versus the less creative, but more selfish, businessman.  
However, the question remains whether entrepreneurially talented people 
actually try to start a business or try to get venture capital for a start-up. It is therefore 
also questionable whether the selfishness of entrepreneurially talented people does 
actually translate into welfare losses due to negative externalities and moral hazard 
problems. In fact, entrepreneurship research suggests that many factors other than 
entrepreneurial talent, such as individual values, social norms and formal institutions, 
influence whether or not people actually start or attempt to start a business (Krueger 
et al., 2000, Kolvereid & Issaksen, 2006, Krueger, 2009). Further, following Baumol’s 
(1990) argumentation that institutions are needed to channel the allocation of 
entrepreneurial intent, Bowen and DeClerq (2008) as well as Sobel (2008) show that 
institutions are indeed effective in determining people’s allocation into different types 
of entrepreneurship. Thus, formal and informal institutions have the potential to sort 
the group of a society’s entrepreneurs, from very social to very egoistic, into specific 
types of entrepreneurial activities. It is, therefore, unclear whether those people who 
perceive being talented for starting a business behave in the same way as those who 
effectively want to start one up. While Weitzel et al’s (2010) results reflect an 
interesting first study on entrepreneurially talented people, they do not, however, 
allow to conclude anything about people who actually intent to start a business and, 
perhaps, apply for venture capital. 
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The contribution of this study is to test the relationship between 
entrepreneurial intent and benevolent preferences. In order to elicit the degree to 
which participants care about other participants’ returns, this study does not use 
dictator games, but confronts participants with multiple risky investment 
opportunities and the decision on how much to invest in these opportunities. By 
investing, participants impose either positive, negative or no externalities on a 
separate group of participants; the more they gain the more will others loose or gain. 
We refer to these investment opportunities as productive, destructive and neutral, 
respectively. This design puts decisions on risky investments center stage, and allows 
a direct comparison of productive with destructive investment opportunities, as well 
as a comparison of both with opportunities not involving others. By combining 
measures of entrepreneurial intent, entrepreneurial self-efficacy and general self-
efficacy with participants’ investment behavior, we can analyze whether or not these 
personality characteristics are associated with the level of participants’ exploitations 
of destructive and productive opportunities. Besides investigating the dependency 
between entrepreneurial intent and investment behavior, we can also test if this 
relation is different for entrepreneurial talent (self-efficacy). Moreover, by comparing 
perceptions of entrepreneurial talent with those of general talent, we can test if a 
potential talent effect as the one observed by Weitzel et al. (2010) is 
entrepreneurship-specific. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first test of the association of 
entrepreneurial intent, on the one hand, and benevolent or selfish behavior, on the 
other hand. Our experimental results show that participants who consider 
entrepreneurship as a future occupation invest significantly less than other people in 
destructive opportunities (and as much as others in productive and in neutral ones). 
This is the opposite effect of people with entrepreneurial talent: consistent with 
Weitzel et al. (2010), we find that participants who perceive themselves as being good 
in doing business invest more in destructive opportunities (and more in neutral and in 
productive opportunities). Further, extending Weitzel et al. (2010) and in support of 
Baumol (1990), we show that indeed entrepreneurship-specific talent, and not general 
talent, plays a distinct role in investment decisions with negative externalities: the 
investment behavior of the generally talented does not differ from that of other 
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participants, neither for productive nor for destructive opportunities. Taken together, 
our results imply that, in contrast to generally talented people, entrepreneurially 
talented people who are willing to exploit destructive opportunities do not confine 
such activities to private ventures, but may also pursue them – and possibly even more 
so – in other occupations.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical background and related research. Section 3 describes the design, 
procedure and hypotheses of the experiment. Section 4 reports the results, which are 
discussed in the concluding Section 5. 
2. Related research 
This study is part of a larger research stream studying the personality-related 
correlates of entrepreneurship (Rauch & Frese, 2007), which includes openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (e.g., Zhao et al., 
2010; Gruber, in press), optimism (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009), locus of control 
(Bonnett & Furnham, 1991, Wijbenga & van Witteloostuijn, 2007), but also risk 
preferences (Brockhaus, 1980; Caliendo et al., 2009), need for control or need for 
autonomy (Brockhaus, 1982), and achievement motivation (Bonnett & Furnham, 
1991, Wijbenga & van Witteloostuijn, 2007). This study contributes to this research by 
motivating the relevance of benevolence as a personality characteristic to be 
addressed in entrepreneurship research. In doing so, entrepreneurship research 
would follow recent psychological research on personality traits that argues that 
honesty and humility represent a sixth personality trait complementing the more 
established five-dimensional ‘Big Five’ personality models (Ashton & Lee, 2007). This 
new factor relates to fairness and greed. Recently, this sixth trait has been empirically 
shown to be associated with benevolent behavior in dictator games (Hilbig & Zettler, 
2009). This study investigates the correlations between benevolence, on the one hand, 
and entrepreneurial intentions, as well as entrepreneurial and general self-efficacy, on 
the other hand.  
Recent research on the relation of personality characteristics and 
entrepreneurship focuses on the role of personality in the formation of 
entrepreneurial intentions and resulting venture performances (Rauch & Frese, 2007; 
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Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; Zhao et al., 2009). These studies provide a more detailed 
understanding of how people select occupations and how specific personality 
characteristics help or hinder the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities. Specific 
elements of one’s personality can influence the motivation to start a business – e.g., the 
need for autonomy (Brockhaus 1982) or the need to avoid risks (Caliendo et al., 2009). 
Personality also affects a potential entrepreneur’s perceived fit with tasks required to 
start a business and this fit finally also impacts the performance in entrepreneurial 
occupations (Zhao et al. 2009; Caliendo et al., 2010). While rarely discussed, fairness 
and benevolence play an important role in many business processes that potentially 
involve moral hazard. With respect to entrepreneurship, such issues may be raised 
within an entrepreneurial team, but also in relation to other business partners 
(Fairchild, in press). Fairchild (2010), for instance, shows how selfishness of 
entrepreneurs, via moral hazard risks, causes inefficiencies in relations with venture 
capitalists. As such, the allocation of personalities with respect to selfishness and 
benevolence across different roles and players in an economy can substantially affect 
the efficiency, the success, and the failure of entrepreneurship. 
Our motivation to consider entrepreneurs’ personalities does not solely refer to 
their role in the formation of intent or in increasing returns for the entrepreneur and 
other shareholders. Instead, we also look at the entrepreneur’s personality in order to 
identify the potential threat resulting from successful entrepreneurship that can cause 
substantial negative externalities to other parts of a society. As Baumol (1990) points 
out, high individual returns to highly talented entrepreneurs do not exclude negative 
externalities to society. To illustrate such unproductive entrepreneurship in excessive 
litigation and legal engagement, Baumol (1990) refers to “a previously unused legal 
gambit that is effective in diverting rents to those who are first in exploiting it” (p. 
897). He also regards novel ways of tax evasion and avoidance as an important form of 
unproductive entrepreneurship. Other areas of entrepreneurial rent-seeking that 
Baumol (1990: 915) cites are “speculative financial transactions without much (if any) 
contribution to the productive capacity of the economy.” Assuming that 
entrepreneurially talented people exploit opportunities that maximize their private 
return irrespective of potentially associated externalities, Baumol (1990) calls for 
formal institutions to channel entrepreneurial energy into more productive activities 
7 
 
rather than unproductive activities and rent-seeking. If Baumol’s (1990) assumption 
exaggerates actual entrepreneurs’ selfishness, formal institutions preventing 
destructive behavior may lead to overregulation, which may crowd out intrinsic 
motivation for benevolent behavior (e.g., Frey, 1997; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).  
To sum up, entrepreneurs’ personalities and their values with respect to 
selfishness and benevolence have a substantial economic impact: micro-economically 
with respect to principal agent and cooperation dilemmas related to new venture 
formation; macro-economically with respect to the type of entrepreneurial 
opportunities that is selected for further development (i.e., productive, neutral or 
destructive). It is therefore important to understand the social preferences of business 
people in general, and of entrepreneurs in particular. 
While people are generally found to not only maximize their private returns 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Binmore & 
Shaked, 2010; Fehr & Schmidt, 2010; Wilson, 2010), it is an open question whether or 
not this personality dimension equally applies to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have 
been found to differ from managers and other people along various personality 
dimensions, e.g., with regard to their need for control or their need for autonomy 
(Brockhaus, 1982) and their achievement motivation (Bonnett & Furnham, 1991; 
Wijbenga & van Witteloostuijn, 2007). We are, however, not aware of any empirical 
research that sheds light on their specific social preferences.  
Theoretically, there are multiple mechanisms that may lead to a heterogeneous 
allocation of selfishness across different economic roles. In motivating personality 
differences of entrepreneurs, Zhao et al. (2010) suggest that people seek occupations 
that match their personality. Within the context of organizational behavior, Schneider 
(1987: 441) discusses mechanisms leading to specific allocations of persons to 
organizations: “Attraction to an organization, selection by it, and attrition from it yield 
particular kinds of persons in an organization. These people determine organizational 
behavior.” Such arguments can be used to motivate a positive but also a negative 
association between benevolence and entrepreneurship. If entrepreneurship is 
associated with, and if entrepreneurs’ role images corroborate, private profit 
maximization, then it is very likely that such people also allocate into 
entrepreneurship (see Starr & Fondas, 1992, on entrepreneurs’ roles and 
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socialization). The opposite can, however, be argued, too. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) 
and Lazear and Shaw (2007) argue that people chose their jobs according to the 
offered compensation scheme and that the perceived fairness of these schemes 
influences their choice. Among the important elements contributing to the perceptions 
of the compensation schemes is a direct relation between one’s own performance and 
the resulting rewards (Lazear & Shaw, 2007). Believing in a high influence of own 
performance on final outcomes reflects an internal locus of control (Rotter, 1975), 
which is usually assumed to be stronger for entrepreneurship than for other 
occupations (Locke & Baum, 2007). Moreover, a direct relation between individual 
performance and compensation maybe considered as fair, because the decisions of 
others and of potential free-riding behavior play a smaller role. If this is the case, then 
people who value a fair compensation for their efforts may have a higher tendency to 
allocate into entrepreneurship. These are two of possibly various mechanisms that 
generate heterogeneity across entrepreneurship and other occupations with respect 
to benevolent behavior. We can, therefore, not assume that the subpopulation of 
entrepreneurs mirrors people’s average fairness and benevolence preferences. 
The study by Weitzel et al. (2010) makes a first step in studying the association 
of entrepreneurship and benevolent behavior. In a laboratory experiment, Weitzel et 
al. (2010) elicit participants’ other regarding behavior based on several different 
versions of the dictator game. Weitzel et al.’s (2010) experimental results show that 
independent of the version of the dictator game, entrepreneurial talent was generally 
negatively associated with benevolent behavior. This relation was, however, 
moderated by the participants’ self-reported belief to be creative. With respect to the 
business component of entrepreneurial talent, Weitzel et al.’s (2010) results seem to 
support Baumol’s (1990) assumption that entrepreneurial talent seeks to maximize 
private but not social returns, or at least does this more than other people. These first 
results on the association between entrepreneurial talent and benevolence, however, 
are silent about people who actually intent to start a business and to what degree 
these potential entrepreneurs care about the associated externalities.  
Believing in high entrepreneurial talent does not automatically imply the intent 
to start a business. According to Bird (1988), entrepreneurial intent is the first critical 
step in the process of becoming an entrepreneur. In the formation of entrepreneurial 
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intentions, research has highlighted the important role of entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
or the belief to be able to perform activities required to start a business (Krueger et al., 
2000). Based on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), however, a number of 
studies argue and show empirically that social norms can lead people who expect to be 
successful entrepreneurs to nevertheless choose a different occupation (Kolvereid & 
Isaksen, 2006; Ikovleva & Kolvereid, 2009). Exploiting the moderating role of social 
norms and institutions, Baumol (1990) calls upon politicians to implement institutions 
that prevent entrepreneurially talented people from selecting into potentially 
destructive activities. Baumol’s (1990) policy recommendations thus explicitly hinge 
on the distinction between talent and intent. Empirical studies by Bowen and De 
Clercq (2008) and Sobel (2008) reveal that institutions and social norms do, indeed, 
influence people’s occupational choices into entrepreneurship in general, and into 
productive versus destructive entrepreneurship in particular. It is therefore unlikely 
that the group of people who start or intent to start a business have a similar 
personality profile as the group of people with entrepreneurial talent. 
Based on the theoretically predicted and empirically observed differences 
between talent and (planned) actions, our study contributes to the understanding of 
benevolence and entrepreneurship by considering entrepreneurial intentions. The 
latter are operationalized as people’s perceived likelihood of starting an own business 
during the next five years (Krueger et al., 2000). These intentions already incorporate 
people’s perceptions of social norms and institutions that encourage or hinder 
entrepreneurship (Krueger et al., 2000; Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2006). They also capture 
people’s preferences that are independent of their talent. The intention – as it is 
measured here – reflects the entrepreneurial occupational choice short of the final act 
of actually starting a business to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity. We therefore 
study potential entrepreneurs that are still searching for, identifying or developing 
opportunities, and analyze how much they care about negative (and positive) 
externalities. By additionally eliciting people’s entrepreneurial self-efficacy, we are 
able to compare the associations of participants’ other-regarding behavior with both 
entrepreneurial intent and self-efficacy. 
While the relation between benevolence and entrepreneurial intent is the main 
focus of this study, we would also like to draw attention to a related, though different 
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aspect. A number of talent allocation models (Murphy et al., 1993; Acemoglu, 1995) 
followed Baumol’s (1990) pioneering work on the allocation of entrepreneurial talent. 
However, these models do not assume entrepreneurial talent as a necessary condition 
for rent-seeking activities. Instead, they focus on more general talent, consisting of, for 
instance, “great intelligence, energy, or other generally valuable traits. Such people […] 
can become entrepreneurs, government officials, lawyers, speculators, clerics, etc.” 
(Murphy et al., 1991: 504). In these models, general talent of the “best and the 
brightest” (Murphy et al., 1991: 505), not entrepreneurial talent, is deemed sufficient 
to be a productive entrepreneur.4 This poses an interesting question to Baumol’s 
(1990) model and predictions as well as to Weitzel et al.’s (2010) empirical findings: if 
entrepreneurial talent is not identical to general talent, which of the two, if at all, is 
then to blame for rent-seeking and other unproductive entrepreneurial activities? By 
eliciting participants’ entrepreneurial self-efficacy and their general self-efficacy, we 
are able to shed light on whether or not entrepreneurial talent has a distinct 
association with benevolent behavior. 
3. The experiment and the study design 
3.1 Study design 
We examine the association between entrepreneurship and benevolent 
behavior at the micro level by means of a correlation study that uses an incentivized 
laboratory experiment to elicit benevolent behavior5 and psychometric scales to 
measure entrepreneurial intent, which are “indications of how hard people are willing 
to try […] to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991: 181), entrepreneurial self-efficacy, 
defined as one’s self-attributed ability to perform activities required to start a business 
(Krueger et al., 2000), and general self-efficacy, defined as the self-perception of one’s 
ability to perform well across a variety of different situations (Judge et al., 1997). The 
study design combines experimentally elicited as well as self-reported personality 
                                               
4 In their allocation model of general talent, Murphy et al. (1991: 503-504) explicitly stress that “[s]ome 
people have strong comparative advantage from natural talent for particular activities, such as singing, 
painting, or playing basketball. […] But other people do not have such great specialized abilities, but at 
the same time possess great intelligence, energy, or other generally valuable traits. Such people can 
become one of the best in many occupations, unlike the best singer or basketball player. They can 
become entrepreneurs, government officials, lawyers, speculators, clerics, etc.” 
5 For a discussion on the use of experiments in entrepreneurship research, see Schade (2005), and 
Schade and Burmeister (2009). 
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characteristics, and is similar to the design employed by Elston and Audretsch 
(forthcoming) and by Weitzel et al. (2010).  
We confront participants with an entrepreneurial investment decision with 
risky payoffs and positive, negative, as well as neutral externalities. The basic 
investment decision is based on one of the earliest notions of entrepreneurial behavior 
by Richard Cantillon (1730), who identified the willingness to bear the personal 
financial risk of a venture as the defining characteristic of an entrepreneur. In our 
experiment, participants receive a fixed budget  and can then either invest an 
amount  into a coin toss , with , or do not invest at all  and 
simply keep the budget  as a safe income. If participants decide to invest into the 
coin toss, they receive a multiple of the invested amount,  (with ), as a 
return R to their investment if they win, and nothing if they lose:  
 
Hence, their expected payoff from the risky investment decision is 
 
with a probability  and . Risk-loving participants would invest into the 
coin toss if , as the expected return is lower than the invested amount 
. With a multiple , investments are risk neutral ; and 
with a multiple , even risk-averse participants would choose to invest into the 
coin toss as their expected returns are higher than their investment . We 
used the following four multiples in the experiment: , ,  and 
. 
In order to apply the entrepreneurial investment decision explained above to 
the specific test of benevolent behavior, a treatment variable that introduces positive 
and negative externalities is needed. Only by adding such externalities, we can 
distinguish destructive from productive entrepreneurial investment. We therefore 
introduce two groups of participants, henceforth referred to as investors (Group A) 
and non-investors (Group B). The payoffs of investors are determined by their 
investment decisions as described above. The payoffs of non-investors, however, are 
solely and passively determined by investors’ decisions, a condition that makes 
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investments of investors subject to positive or negative externalities on non-investors 
– and hence to the impact of destructive (negative externalities) and productive 
(positive externalities) entrepreneurial behavior. The investors are informed of the 
nature and extent of the externalities ex ante.  
Participants know from the start which group they belong to. In order to 
increase the number of observations for Group A (investors), , we limit the size of 
Group B (non-investors) to  participants. Participants in Group B equally 
share the average positive or negative externality of the participants in Group A. While 
this design cannot identify benevolent behavior in a one-to-one situation, the context 
of a group of people being exposed to externalities that are jointly caused by another 
group of investors mimics a possibly more realistic setting. The salience of fairness 
and benevolence considerations exert a substantial influence on corresponding 
behavior in laboratory experiments (Houser & Xiao, 2010). According to Oechssler 
(2009), this limits the insights that can be gained from studying one-to-one dictator 
games, which were employed by Weitzel et al. (2010). Indeed, it is unlikely that 
benevolence considerations are the most salient feature in entrepreneurial decisions. 
In our setting, the positive or negative externalities of a single investor do not directly 
affect a single non-investor, but are conjointly, with the externalities caused by other 
investors, imposed on the group of non-investors. This makes the responsibility of a 
single investor not only less salient, but arguably more realistic. Results by Güth et al. 
(2008) and Brennan et al. (2008) suggest that risk considerations can lead to a 
crowding out of other-regarding behavior. Differences with respect to benevolent 
behavior in our setting may thus generalize easier to more realistic scenarios than 
results from dictator games, where fairness considerations are at the core of the game 
and extremely salient.  
In order to avoid bankruptcy, all participants in Group B receive an initial 
budget . Initial budgets are known to all players. The total payoff of a participant in 
Group B, , is shown below. Essentially, it is a function of the average return Ri of nI 
investors (indicated by i) distributed to nN non-investors and an ‘impact factor’ , 
which represents the treatment variable that determines the sign and intensity of the 
externality on non-investors: 
13 
 



In
i
iNI
NN R
nn
BP
1
1

 
In the experiment, the impact factor  could take nine different values from 
 to  in steps of 0.25: –1.0, –0.75, –0.5, –0.25, 0.0, +0.25, +0.5, +0.75, and 
+1.0  Investors’ success exerts negative externalities on non-investors if α is less than 
zero and positive externalities if α is greater than zero. If it equals zero, then no 
externalities exist. Pooling of the externalities created by all investors in group A and 
sharing them among all receivers in group B generates a dependency at the session 
level, which needs to be taken into account when analyzing the data. In total, the four 
investment multiples  and the nine impact factors α define 36 entrepreneurial 
investment decisions with differing returns to investments and differing externalities. 
In the following, we will refer to the different combinations of investment multiples 
and impact factors as ‘scenarios’.  
 
3.2 Participants  
Based on the theoretical literature, people with entrepreneurial intent or 
entrepreneurial talent, present in any population, will self-select into the diverse set of 
activities available to them in their society. We therefore conducted our experiments 
with a diverse group of students for whom it is a priori unclear what activities the 
existing entrepreneurial talent among them will select into and who have not yet 
selected themselves. Despite the potential benefits of focusing on groups of 
professionals for experiments (Drehman et al., 2005; Alevy et al., 2007; Elston & 
Audretsch, forthcoming), professional subjects have already made their occupational 
choice. In order to avoid any potential biases of occupational choice, we therefore 
focused on subjects who have not yet selected into, for instance, formally registered 
entrepreneurship or wage employment. For a more detailed discussion on the use of 
student samples in business research, we refer to Bello et al. (2009) and, in our 
specific context, Weitzel et al. (2010). 
All participants in the experiment were drawn from a subject pool with 
approximately 1,400 students who were enrolled in bachelor and master programs at 
Utrecht University (The Netherlands). We recruited students from all disciplines, 
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ranging from the natural to humanities and the social sciences. Altogether, 111 
subjects participated, of which 87 were in group A of investors and 24 were in group B 
as non-investors. In group A, we have 32 male and 55 female participants with an 
average age of 21.7 (and a standard deviation of 3.14). 
 
3.3 Psychometric measurements  
To measure entrepreneurial intent we ask participants for their perceptions of 
the likelihood to become an entrepreneur within the next five years (Krueger et al., 
2000). This self-predictive measure of entrepreneurial intent has been found to be 
consistent with other measures of entrepreneurial intent (Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2006). 
Note that this measure reflects the preparedness for and expectations about the 
unexpected occurrence of an entrepreneurial opportunity (Kirzner, 1997; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003). As discussed in the previous sections, 
entrepreneurial intent incorporates more factors than entrepreneurial self-efficacy. 
Those who believe that they will not start a business may do so because of a number of 
reasons. On the one hand, these reasons may be talent-related. They may believe that 
they are not able to identify an opportunity, to capture one that may occur 
unexpectedly, or to perform at a level that makes this opportunity more attractive 
than the currently available alternatives to entrepreneurship. On the other hand, they 
may also simply think that factors outside of their control, such as institutions, make 
them less likely to start a business. Our measure of entrepreneurial intent therefore 
captures more than talent. In fact, informal institutions such as social norms are 
shown to play an important role in the formation of entrepreneurial intent (Krueger et 
al., 2000; Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2006, Ikoleva & Kolvereid, 2009).  
To classify people into more or less entrepreneurially talented participants, we 
measured entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE). Table 1 provides a list of all items. Chen 
et al. (1998) and Zhao et al. (2005) measure ESE by referring to very specific tasks and 
skills that are needed to start up and run a business. While Zhao et al.’s (2005) scale is 
less specific than the one by Chen et al. (1998), Wilson et al. (2007) offer an even 
better alternative. They measure ESE with no direct reference to start-ups and 
business operations. We therefore use this six-item scale in our study to measure 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE). For the items on entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
15 
 
(ESE), suggested by Wilson et al. (2007), a common factor analysis shows one-
dimensionality, generating a single factor with an eigenvalue above one.6 The internal 
reliability is rather low with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.58. Upon closer inspection, we 
find that the scale includes one item with an extremely low factor loading of 0.09. After 
excluding this item, Cronbach’s alpha increases to 0.66, indicating an internal 
reliability sufficient for further exploratory research (Hair et al., 2005). We use both 
the shorter scale (ESE*) and the original scale (ESE) to enable comparisons with 
earlier studies.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Finally, in order to measure general talent (in contrast to entrepreneurial 
talent), we use the ten-item general self-efficacy (GSE) scale from Schwarzer and 
Jerusalem (1995). Table 1 provides a list of all items. For these items, a common factor 
analysis shows a single factor with an eigenvalue above one. Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75 
indicates a sufficient internal reliability. 
 
3.4 Procedures 
Six experimental sessions with 111 participants were conducted in December 
2007 at the experimental laboratory ELSE at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. 
The experiment sessions were computerized, using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Participants were randomly seated at PCs, separated from each other by visual 
screens. Instructions were then distributed and questions were answered in private.7 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to be 
investors or non-investors (labeled as Group A and Group B, respectively) and were 
privately informed about their group on one of the entry screens. Additionally, on each 
                                               
6 After adding additional items, Weitzel et al. (2010) find that the ESE items form two dimensions, where 
business talent is separate from the item related to creativity. In our data, the two dimensions correlate 
significantly (r = 0.23 with p = 0.03), but this is only due to five data points that score extremely low on 
creativity (correlation without these data points is r = 0.11 with p = 0.35). Our exploitation of the potential 
multi-dimensionality is limited, because our analysis builds on fewer items than Weitzel et al. (2010). In order 
to enable comparisons between studies, we decided to report results not only for the reduced scale with 
sufficient internal reliability, but also for the full scale. Furthermore, excluding the creativity item from the full 
scale, which represents what Weitzel et al. (2010) call ‘business talent’, reveals qualitatively the same results 
as the full scale (detailed analyses available on request from the first author). 
7 Upon request, the instructions are available from the corresponding author. 
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of the 36 decision screens, there was a reminder of their group assignment. 
Participants stayed in their group throughout the whole session. At the end of the 
sessions, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire. During this time, payoffs 
were prepared by the instructor. In all six sessions, the group of non-investors (Group 
B) consisted of four participants. There were between 13 and 16 investors per session 
in Group A, with an average of 14.5 investors. 
The sequence of the 36 decisions screens was randomly determined for each 
participant individually. The initial endowments of participants in group A and B were 
announced as part of the instructions. The outcomes of the coin tosses were revealed 
at the very end of the session. To keep non-investors busy, we asked them to go 
through the same set of 36 investment decision screens as Group A. Group B, however, 
was informed that their decisions are purely hypothetical and that their own payoffs 
are solely determined by investors. As non-investors’ decisions are not incentive 
compatible, we do not include them in our analysis. All results reported in this paper 
refer to the group of investors only. 
Earnings of investors were determined by the average payoff of four 
individually and randomly selected scenarios. To keep the variation of payoffs 
manageable and also to stress that all investment multiples are equally important we 
randomly selected one decision per multiple. Earnings of non-investors were 
determined by only one randomly and separately selected scenario. For example, if the 
scenario with a multiple of 2 and an impact factor of +0.5 was randomly selected, all 
respective investment decisions and winnings of investors, irrespective of their 
position in the individual decision sequences, were used to calculate non-investors’ 
payoffs. Selecting only one out of the 36 scenarios prevented potential strategizing by 
investors on averaging effects across several positive and negative externalities. 
Further, it ensured the maximum variance of externalities on non-investors’ payoffs. 
Before starting the experiment, investors were informed that they receive a 
fixed budget of 8 Euros for each of their 36 investment decisions. Note that not all of 
these budgets were finally paid out, but only the average of four randomly selected 
scenarios. Participants in Group B were informed that they receive an initial budget of 
 Euros in order to avoid bankruptcy. This amount is equal to the expected 
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payoff of an investor.8 In the worst case, this would leave non-investors with a show-
up fee of 2 Euro.9 The average payoff was 11.31 Euro for investors and 14.85 Euro for 
non-investors, with a standard deviation of 5.98 Euro and 2.58 Euro, respectively. 
4. Results 
For the 87 participants who have been assigned the role as investors, we find 
substantial correlation between entrepreneurial self-efficacy and general self-efficacy 
(rESE,GSE= 0.41 with p < 0.001, rESE*,GSE= 0.44 with p < 0.001). Entrepreneurial intent 
correlates moderately with general self-efficacy (r = 0.263 with p = 0.01) and weakly 
with entrepreneurial self-efficacy (rEI,ESE= 0. 15 with p = 0.16, rEI,ESE*= 0.23 with p = 
0.03). Note that intent positively correlates with being a foreign student (r = 0.44 with 
p < 0.001), and that study duration negatively correlates with general self-efficacy (r = 
–0.22 with p < 0.04). For more details, we refer to Table 2. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 plots the average responses across all treatments. As expected, we observe 
that the larger the potential gain (i.e., the larger the multiple), the more people invest. 
With regard to the impact factor, the figure suggests that this treatment variable 
primarily matters when it changes its sign from a negative externality to a non-
negative externality and vice versa. The actual magnitude of the impact variable, 
however, does not seem to have a significant effect on the investment level. Below, this 
will also be shown econometrically. Further, when there is no externality participants 
seem to invest as much as in the presence of a positive externality.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
--------------------------------------------- 
                                               
8 A risk-averse participant in Group A would not invest in coin tosses with multiples m = 1.75 or m = 2, 
but fully invest if m = 4 or m = 6. This would result in an expected payoff of (8+8+0.5*4*8+0.5.*6*8)/4 = 
14. 
9 Assume a multiple m = 6 and that all participants in Group A invest their fixed budget and win. Given a 
budget of 8 Euro and an impact factor of , the four participants in Group B would have to 
equally share a negative externality of  Euro, leaving each of them with 14-12 = 2 Euro. 
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To explore the data more systematically, we employ regression analyses. The 
data from our experiment are clustered at the subject and the session level, because of 
multiple responses by the same individual and the pooling of externalities at the 
session level. In order to handle this data structure, we employ a multilevel modeling 
approach by using a random coefficient regression (Cohen et al., 2003) based on 
procedures suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skondal (2005) for the software package 
STATA. At the level of the session, we estimate a random intercept. We estimate random 
coefficients for the period of the decision, the type of the decision (i.e., destructive, 
neutral, or productive), and the multiple at the level of single individuals. Table 3 
reports the regression results. We also run the analyses with simpler model structures 
– i.e., only with random intercepts – or only with a single level of clustering within-
subject (available from the corresponding author upon request). In both cases, our 
results remain intact. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The first row in Table 3 (Model I) includes control variables as well as the 
period and dummies for multiples. The period does not play a significant role, but the 
multiples clearly do: compared to a potential doubling of the investment – i.e., m = 2 – 
participants invest – as could be expected – significantly less for m = 1.75 (βx175 = –.69, 
z = 5.74 and p < 0.001), and significantly more for m = 4.00 (βx400 = 1.65, z = 8.64 and p 
< 0.001) and for m = 6.00 (βx600 = 2.43, z = 11.40 and p < 0.001).  
Model II additionally includes a contrast code DvP for destructive versus 
productive as well as a dummy N for neutral scenarios. The contrast code enables us to 
directly test the difference between destructive and productive scenarios, which is our 
main interest in this study. Consistent with widespread empirical evidence that people 
care about others (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni & 
Miller, 2002), we find that participants invest much more in scenarios with positive 
than with negative externalities (βDvP = 0.37, z = 3.83 and p < 0.001). The dummy for 
neutral settings captures an effect of the presence of externalities independent of their 
sign. Participants decide differently depending of whether or not there are 
externalities, may they be positive or negative. Social considerations might, for 
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instance, reduce the attention given to risk considerations. We observe that in the 
neutral scenario, participants invest more compared to the average of scenarios with 
externalities (βN = 0.41, z = 3.11 and p = 0.002). This effect is driven by destructive 
settings. For productive scenarios, the investment is not significantly different from its 
level in neutral settings (βN – βDvP = 0.04, z = 0.37 and p = 0.71). 
Model III reports the regression results for entrepreneurial intent. We find no 
main effect (βEI = -0.17, z = 1.06 and p = 0.29), but significant interactions. Panel A in 
Figure 2 visualizes the interaction effects. There is a significant difference between the 
destructive and the productive setting with respect to the relation between intent and 
investments (βEIxDvP = 0.19, z = 2.12 and p = 0.03). As shown in Figure 2, the overall 
effect (main plus interaction effect) indicates no difference in investment behavior 
with regard to neutral opportunities (βEI +βEIxN = 0.05, z = 0.32 and p = 0.75) or 
productive opportunities (βEI +βEIxDvP = 0.02, z = 0.11 and p = 0.92), but a significantly 
lower investment in the face of destructive opportunities (βEI -βEIxDvP = -0.36, z = 1.96 
and p = 0.05). The more participants consider a start-up as a likely future occupational 
option, the less they seem to be willing to accept damage associated with their own 
gains, although they invest at equally high levels as others in non-destructive 
scenarios. This result for entrepreneurial intent stands in contrast to the findings for 
entrepreneurial talent. Weitzel et al. (2010) find that people with entrepreneurial 
talent care less about others. In order to enable a comparison, it is therefore important 
to estimate Weitzel et al.’s (2010) previously found effect of entrepreneurial talent 
with our data.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Models IV and V report the regression results for entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
using the measurement without and with a weak item, respectively (ESE*, ESE). For 
both models, we find a significant main effect (βESE* = 0.40, z = 2.72 and p = 0.006 and 
βESE = 0.38, z = 2.54 and p = 0.01). We find no interaction effects. Indeed, the 
visualizations in Panels B and C of Figure 2 indicate no interaction effect. Those who 
believe to be entrepreneurially talented invest more across all scenarios and the 
difference in destructive scenarios is about as large as in productive scenarios 
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(βESE*xDvP = 0.01, z = 0.07 and p = 0.95). Hence, participants with entrepreneurial talent 
invest more in destructive scenarios, which is consistent with Weitzel et al. (2010).  
For general self-efficacy (Model VI and Panel D in Figure 2), we do not find any 
statistically significant effect. Neither the main effect (βGSE = .03, z = 0.22 and p = 0.82) 
nor the interaction effects are significant (βGSExN = -.01, z = .11 and p = 0.91, βGSExDvP = -
.03, z = .28 and p = 0.78). 
As a robustness check, Model VI is re-estimated including all three variables: 
entrepreneurial intent, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and general self-efficacy. The 
results remain robust. The results of Models II – V suggest that the effects of intent 
differ from entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and these in turn differ from general self-
efficacy. The full Model VI enables us to statistically test for possible differences 
between the three variables. Note that these variables were standardized before being 
entered into the regression such that their effect sizes are comparable. We find that 
the three coefficients for the main effect and the two interaction effects of 
entrepreneurial intent jointly and significantly differ from entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
(²(6) = 19.61 with p=0.003). This also applies when testing the interaction with 
destructive versus productive scenarios individually, albeit at the 10% level (²(6) = 
5.59 with p = 0.06). Similarly, the three coefficients of entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
significantly differ from general self-efficacy effects (²(6) = 13.31 with p = 0.04). 
In further robustness checks, we tested the need for modeling the session level 
and the use of random coefficients at the subject level. We removed corresponding 
parameters from the model and used Likelihood-ratio tests to check whether the 
model fit decreases. This is a rather conservative test (Self & Liang, 1994). The results 
for the models that are of special interest (Models III and IV) suggest that controls for 
session and subject level effects are indeed needed. When removing the session level 
random effects, the fit of the estimations significantly decreases for Model III and the 
change just marginally misses significance for Model IV (²(1) = 5.67 with p = 0.02 and 
²(27) = 3.70 with p = 0.05). When dropping the random coefficients at the individual 
level, the models’ fit significantly drops (²(27) = 1543.47 with p < 0.001 and ²(27) = 
1506.28 with p < 0.001). Independent of the specification, however, the estimated 
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effects associated with destructive versus productive settings are consistent with 
those reported in Table 3.  
To further illustrate the robustness of our results non-parametrically, we split 
the sample, for each externality category (destructive, neutral, productive), along the 
medians of the self-efficacy and intent variables. Figure 3 plots the average 
investments within these sub-samples. In support of the robustness of our findings, all 
significant effects in the structural regression analysis are also visible in the 
interaction plots based on simple sample-splits.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
5. Discussion 
This paper advances the research on personality characteristics that correlate 
with entrepreneurs (compare Rauch & Frese, 2007; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; Zhao et 
al., 2010; Gruber, in press) by focusing on benevolent behavior. In doing so, we inform 
economic models of entrepreneurship that make assumptions about the other-
regarding preferences of potential and actual entrepreneurs (e.g., Baumol, 1990; 
Casmatta 2003; Eltizur & Gavious, 2003; Fairchild, 2010; Fairchild, in press). We believe 
that benevolent preferences not only have a situational component (Houser and Xiao, 
2010), but also include a trait-like element so that people who have the tendency to 
care about others also show this behavior in different contexts. In fact, Weitzel et al. 
(2010) find that, despite varying absolute levels of benevolent behavior across 
different versions of the dictator game, the correlation of this behavior with 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy is rather stable. Extending this research, we test in a 
laboratory environment whether benevolent behavior in an investment decision is 
correlated with entrepreneurial intentions. Furthermore, we compare the correlations 
of entrepreneurial intent and entrepreneurial self-efficacy, because prior research 
indicates that there is no perfect mapping between the two. 
We find that our participants generally invest less in destructive than in 
productive opportunities. This is in line with previous results on other-regarding 
preferences, which show that, on average, people care about others (e.g., Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Our experimental treatments include 
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substantial risks and the element of benevolence is less salient than in, for example, 
dictator games (Oechssler, 2009). Despite this arguable more realistic setting for 
entrepreneurial decisions, we find that benevolent considerations still matter and are 
not crowded out by risk considerations, as suggested by Güth et al. (2008) or Brennan 
et al. (2008). However, the results also show that benevolent preferences only matter 
in terms of the binary condition whether or not the investment decisions causes 
negative (or non-negative) externalities. Participants do not seem to experience a 
‘warm glow’ (Andreoni & Miller, 2002) from investments with positive externalities 
when compared with investments with no externalities, nor do they seem to care 
about the magnitude of positive externalities. 
In our introductory, theoretical discussion we have highlighted that both a 
negative and a positive association of entrepreneurship with benevolence can be 
established; based on person-organization fit theory (e.g., Schneider, 1987; Zhao et al. 
2010), on the entrepreneurs’ socialization and roles literature (Starr & Fondas, 1992), 
and on fairness perceptions with respect to compensation schemes (Fehr & Schmidt, 
2000; Lazear & Shaw, 2007). It requires empirical studies to inform research for the 
further development of such models. We find that participants with high 
entrepreneurial intent invest as much as others in productive scenarios, but 
significantly less in destructive settings. This suggests that social considerations do 
play a supporting role in the decision to start a business. Based on our data, we can 
only speculate why this might be the case. We tentatively suggest that 
entrepreneurship as an occupation is characterized by a compensation scheme that is 
perceived as fairer than many employment relations. 
While our results suggest an optimistic view on potential entrepreneurs, i.e. 
those who actually intent to start a business, our results on entrepreneurial talent 
(self-efficacy) confirm the more pessimistic predictions of Baumol (1990), which are 
also supported by Weitzel et al. (2010). Participants who score high on 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy invest significantly more than others in destructive 
scenarios. We also find, however, that they invest more in productive scenarios. Hence, 
in productive scenarios they produce more positive externalities and in the 
destructive scenarios they also produce more negative externalities. The relative 
difference between the investments in productive and in destructive opportunities is 
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equally large for the more and the less entrepreneurially talented. In our experiment, 
this suggests that the generally higher investments of participants with more 
entrepreneurial talent may be due to a generally higher level of risk-taking.  
Taken together, our contrasting findings on entrepreneurial talent and intent 
raise an interesting question: if those who tend to start a business are less likely to 
exploit destructive opportunities, what career path is then pursued by the 
entrepreneurially more talented but less benevolent participants? Instead of being 
confronted with selfish entrepreneurs, we might have to focus more on selfishness in 
other occupations, such as in managerial careers exploiting business talent. Our results 
suggest that policies that regulate managerial actions and talent are at least equally 
important as institutions and incentive systems that try to support productive and 
avoid destructive entrepreneurship as suggested by Baumol (1990). Our findings also 
inform research on financial contracting and related moral hazard problems 
(Fairchild, in press). The problems seem to be smaller for those who want to start 
their own business compared to other people (e.g., employed managers). If this is 
supported in more comprehensive studies in the future, venture capitalists and other 
investors might benefit from applying different contracts to entrepreneurs and owner-
managers vis-à-vis employed managers (compare Fairchild, 2010).  
Our results provide no indication that the effects found for participants with 
entrepreneurial talent also apply to the more generally talented. Hence, in contrast to 
models of general talent (e.g., Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995; Mehlum et 
al., 2003), but consistent with Baumol (1990) and Weitzel et al. (2010), our findings 
provide additional support for the need to distinguish between entrepreneurial and 
general talent. 
Of course, this study is not without limitations. First, and as discussed in the 
methodology section and above in this section, we acknowledge the general 
limitations of the methods used. This particularly applies to the use of self-reports (for 
a discussion of the appropriateness of the measurement applied in this study, compare 
Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2006) and the limited external validity of laboratory experiments 
and of students as experimental subjects (Schade, 2005; Bello et al., 2009; Schade & 
Burmeister, 2009). Second, because entrepreneurial self-efficacy is assumed to 
influence entrepreneurial intent (Krueger et al., 2000) and general self-efficacy is 
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related to work-related self-efficacy (Chen et al. 2004), which entrepreneurial self-
efficacy is a part of, the comparison of effects in Model VII, which jointly includes both 
variables, might suffer from multicollinearity problems. Depending on how shared 
variance is attributed, the coefficients may vary. Therefore, we also provide the Models 
III and IV that include these variables separately. Third, our study is limited by the 
cultural background of our participants. As we have emphasized, the link between 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intentions is affected by social 
norms. As such, differences in correlations with other variables might reflect 
differences in social norms and, more generally, cultural differences. Whether our 
results from The Netherlands generalize to other contexts, countries and cultures, 
requires further empirical studies. In fact, it might be useful to explicitly incorporate 
measures of the institutional and social environment to analyze their effect on 
participants’ behavior. 
6. Conclusion 
Extending research on personality characteristics of entrepreneurs (Rauch & 
Frese, 2007; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; Zhao et al., 2010; Gruber, in press), we study 
the correlation of selfishness with entrepreneurial intentions. This mirrors the recent 
development in personality research, where the five most important traits – openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism – are complemented 
with a sixth trait – i.e. honesty and humility, which also includes fairness (Ashton & 
Lee, 2007). Our observation that entrepreneurial self-efficacy and intent make a 
difference with respect to selfish behavior, but general talent does not, illustrates that 
the entrepreneurial personality profile plays a distinctive role in our society. 
Finding that entrepreneurial intent is associated with smaller investments in 
destructive opportunities informs research on models of entrepreneurship, such as 
those on moral hazard in contractual relationships between entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists (Fairchild, 2010). Furthermore, the observation that 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy is associated with a higher willingness to accept negative 
externalities, while entrepreneurial intent is associated with a lower willingness to 
harm others, raises the question about the allocation of selfish entrepreneurial talent. 
Models of allocations of entrepreneurial talent need to take this difference into 
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account (compare Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1993; Acemoglu, 1995). Our research 
tentatively suggests that more selfish and entrepreneurially talented people might not 
allocate into formal entrepreneurship, but find other occupations in which they can 
exploit their talent more profitably. This study, however, can only speculate about the 
origins of this effect. Further research is needed to better understand the reasons for 
this divergence.  
Generally, our results call for more research in economics, psychology and 
entrepreneurship that complements talent allocation models with empirical insights 
and theoretical models on the allocation of benevolent preferences. In particular for 
entrepreneurship scholars, the findings of this study (and of Weitzel et al., 2010) 
suggest that selfishness deserves attention as one of entrepreneurs’ distinctive 
personality characteristics. More research on this topic could help policy-makers to 
improve the design of institutions and incentive systems that support productive and 
avoid destructive behavior in entrepreneurship -- but also, and maybe even more so, 
in wage- and bonus-earning occupations. Finally, it could also inform and help 
theorists studying moral hazard problems in entrepreneurs’ relations to their business 
partners. 
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FIGURE 1: Average investment for each impact-multiple combination 
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FIGURE 2: Interaction plots based on regressions 
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* Excluding one weak item from the original measurement proposed by Wilson et al. (2007) 
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FIGURE 3: Interaction plots based on median-based sample splits 
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Notes: Samples splits are based on the median. The median is used to generate balanced sub-samples 
with the following splits: entrepreneurial intent (larger than 11.0 vs. less or equal to 11.0), 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy ESE (larger than 3.5 vs. less than or equal to 3.5), ESE* (larger than or 
equal to 3.6 vs. larger than 3.6), general self-efficacy GSE (larger than or equal to 3.1 vs. larger than 3.1). 
* Excluding one weak item from the original measurement proposed by Wilson et al. (2007) 
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TABLE 1. Overview of the self-efficacy measures used in this study 
 
Entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Wilson et al., 2007) 
Please answer the following questions on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1=much worse, 2=a 
little worse, 3=about the same, 4=a little better, 5=much better.  
 
How do you compare yourself to fellow students in your ability to solve problems? 
a) … solve problems? 
b) … manage money? 
c) … be creative? 
d) … get people to agree with you? 
e) … be a leader? 
f) … make decisions? 
 
General self-efficacy (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) 
Please state to which extent you think the following statement is true on a scale from 1 to 
4, where 1=not at all true, 2=barely true, 3=somewhat true, 4=completely true. 
 
a)  I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough. 
b)  If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want. 
c)  It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals. 
d)  I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events. 
e)  Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations. 
f)  I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
g)  I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping 
abilities. 
h)  When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions. 
i)  If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
j)  I can usually handle whatever comes my way. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Pearson correlation of the individual-specific characteristics 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mean 21.7 .63 .32 4.39 .28 19.8 3.52 3.53 3.10 
Standard deviation 3.14 .49 .47 1.35 .45 25.2 0.65 0.57 0.35 
Min 17 0 0 1 0 0 1.80 2.33 2 
Max 31 1 1 6 1 100 5 5 3.9 
1 Age -         
2 Female -0.10 -        
3 Foreign 0.34** 0.02 -       
4 Study duration -0.11 0.01 0.26* -      
5 Economics -0.00 0.04 0.46*** 0.32** -     
6 Entr. Intent  0.18+ 0.07 0.44*** 0.10 0.11 -    
7 Entr. Self-efficacy* 0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.19+ 0.13 0.23* (0.66)   
8 Entr Self-efficacy 0.03 -0.01 0.14 -0.17 0.18 015 0.95*** (0.58)  
9 General Self-efficacy 0.05 -.13 0.10 -.022* 0.02 0.26* 0.44*** 0.41*** (0.75) 
N = 87 
For multi-item measurements, Cronbach’s alpha is provided on the diagonal in parenthesis. 
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TABLE 3: Regression analyses (maximum likelihood estimations) 
 
Model (DV: investment in €) I  II  III  IV  V  VI   VII 
Constant 0.95 (1.36) 0.64 (1.35) 0.68 (1.35) 0.22 (1.32) 0.34 (1.32) 0.63 (1.37) 0.18 (1.32) 
Age 0.09 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05)+ 0.09 (0.05)+ 0.10 (0.05)+ 0.09 (0.05)+ 0.09 (0.05)+ 0.10 (0.05)+ 
Female -0.16 (0.30) -0.13 (0.30) -0.16 (0.30) -0.07 (0.29) -0.05 (0.29) -0.13 (0.30) -0.12 (0.29) 
Foreign -0.51 (0.38) -0.51 (0.37) -0.35 (0.41) -0.63 (0.36)+ -0.64 (0.36)+ -0.52 (0.38) -0.39 (0.39) 
Study Year 0.20 (0.12)+ 0.21 (0.12)+ 0.21 (0.12)+ 0.30 (0.12)* 0.29 (0.12)* 0.22 (0.12)+ 0.30 (0.12)* 
Bus & Econ 0.36 (0.38) 0.31 (0.38) 0.26 (0.38) 0.21 (0.37) 0.19 (0.37) 0.31 (0.38) 0.11 (0.36) 
Return 1.75 -0.69 (0.12)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** 
Return 4 1.65 (0.19)*** 1.65 (0.19)*** 1.65 (0.19)*** 1.65 (0.19)*** 1.65 (0.19)*** 1.65 (0.19)*** 1.65 (0.19)*** 
Return 6 2.43 (0.21)*** 2.44 (0.21)*** 2.44 (0.21)*** 2.44 (0.21)*** 2.44 (0.21)*** 2.44 (0.21)*** 2.44 (0.21)*** 
Period -0.01 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
             
  
Neutral   N    0.41 (0.13)** 0.41 (0.13)** 0.41 (0.13)** 0.41 (0.13)** 0.41 (0.13)** 0.41 (0.13)** 
Destructive vs. productive   DvP   0.37 (0.10)*** 0.37 (0.09)*** 0.37 (0.10)*** 0.37 (0.10)*** 0.37 (0.10)*** 0.37 (0.09)*** 
             
  
Entrepreneurial Intent EI     -0.17 (0.16)       -0.23 (0.16) 
 EI x N     0.23 (0.12)*       0.28 (0.12)* 
 EI x DvP     0.19 (0.09)*       0.22 (0.09)* 
             
  
Entrepr. Self-Efficacy*: ESE*       0.40 (0.15)**     0.50 (0.16)** 
 ESE* x N       -0.14 (0.12)     -0.20 (0.13) 
 ESE* x DVP       0.01 (0.09)     0.00 (0.10) 
             
  
Entrepr. Self-Efficacy: ESE         0.38 (0.15)*     
 ESE x N         -0.19 (0.12)     
 ESE x DvP         -0.01 (0.09)     
             
  
General Self-efficacy           0.03 (0.15) -0.12 (0.16) 
 GSE x N           -0.01 (0.12) -0.00 (0.13) 
 GSE x DvP           -0.03 (0.09) -0.09 (0.10) 
             
  
Observations 3132  3132  3132  3132  3132  3132  3132  
Individuals 87  87  87  87  87  87  87  
Sessions 6  6  6  6  6  6  6  
Log Lik (²) -6404 (168)*** -5949 (253)*** -5946 (255)*** -5945 (264)*** -5945 (265)*** -5949 (252)*** -5940 (270)*** 
Mixed effect regressions; to control for grouped data structure within session and within individual we estimate random effects at the session 
level and at the level of individuals we estimate random effects and random coefficients (for all variables varying at the at the level of individual).  
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
ESE*: ESE-measurement where one very weak item is excluded from the analysis. 
 
